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ARTICLES 
BANKRUPTCY BOUNDARY GAMES 
David A. Skeel, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
A century ago, securities law and corporate reorganization were flip 
sides of the same coin. When a company sold stock and bonds to the public, 
an investment bank—usually J.P. Morgan or another of a small handful of 
dominant banks—underwrote the issuance with the help of its Wall Street 
lawyers.1 If the company later defaulted, the same Wall Street investment 
bank formed a committee to represent the investors who held the bonds or 
stock it had underwritten. It then negotiated over the terms of a 
reorganization with the company’s managers and with the banks that had 
underwritten other securities on their behalf.2 Equity receivership, as 
corporate reorganization was known then, was simply one facet of 
corporate and securities law. 
The legislative reforms of the New Deal drove a sharp wedge between 
these two previously connected areas of law. The most significant blow was 
struck by the Chandler Act of 1938,3 which purposely ended the old equity 
receivership practice.4 In addition to displacing a debtor’s managers, the 
Chandler Act prohibited the investment banks and lawyers that had 
represented a debtor prior to bankruptcy from participating in the 
bankruptcy case.5 Within a few years, Wall Street corporate reorganization 
practice had largely disappeared. The main source of continuity between 
securities law and bankruptcy practice was the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), which was given a prominent role in corporate 
reorganization by the Chandler Act.6 
During this same era, Congress also passed the nation’s two major 
securities acts, which put securities law on federal footing and laid the 
groundwork for what quickly became an immensely complicated area of 
                                                                                                                 
 *  S. Samuel Arsht Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to David 
Gunther and Daniel Rubin for their helpful research assistance, and to the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School for its generous summer support. 
 1. The historical details in this paragraph and the next are treated at greater length in DAVID 
A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001). 
 2. Id. at 63–69. 
 3. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978). 
 4. Congress had earlier amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544, by adopting 
section 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474–82 (1933), to govern railroad reorganization, and section 77B, 48 
Stat. 912, 912–22 (1934), to govern other reorganizations. But, these amendments had largely 
codified existing receivership practice. 
 5. Chandler Act § 158(3). 
 6. Chandler Act §§ 167–288. 
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law.7 The ever increasing complexity of securities law further reinforced its 
separation from the similarly complex bankruptcy process. As with the 
separation between bankruptcy and other related regulatory regimes,8 the 
isolation of bankruptcy from securities law has created boundary issues in 
areas where they overlap. The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code could have 
responded to the overlapping domains by: (1) overriding the securities law 
in order to promote bankruptcy principles, (2) allowing both sets of rules to 
apply, or (3) deferring to the securities laws. One can find evidence of each 
of these three approaches in the Bankruptcy Code. 
First, with some issues, such as the securities law rules dealing with 
offerings of corporate securities, the drafters have concluded that 
bankruptcy law adequately addresses the concerns that animate the 
securities laws. For example, when a debtor issues new stock or debt in 
connection with a reorganization plan, the debtor is excused from 
complying with the requirements imposed by the Securities Act of 1933.9 
The second stance, coexistence, is perhaps best illustrated by the 
antifraud provisions of the securities laws. Although Congress has enacted a 
welter of bankruptcy-specific antifraud laws,10 bankruptcy does not displace 
securities law antifraud provisions such as § 10(b)11 and Rule 10b-5 which 
prohibit insider trading and inaccurate disclosure.12 Consequently, securities 
law provisions intersect with the bankruptcy framework in an awkward 
fashion at times.13 
This Article is concerned with the last of the three responses, deference 
to the securities laws. Regarding another set of issues, Congress has 
concluded that ordinary bankruptcy principles should give way where there 
is an area of overlap between bankruptcy and securities law. Thus, the 
normal operations of bankruptcy law for corporate debtors are suspended in 
                                                                                                                 
 7. The Securities Act of 1933 was one of the laws enacted during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
first hundred days; the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which established the SEC, followed 
a year later. See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 13 (1982). 
 8. For a detailed analysis of another boundary, the separation between bankruptcy and state 
corporate law, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994). 
 9. 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a) (2006). 
 10. See, e.g., Leah Lorber & Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy Crimes and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 49 (1994) (describing bankruptcy crime provisions). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). 
 13. A particular issue is the application of Rule 10b-5 to the members of creditors’ 
committees. Institutions that actively trade are wary of serving on the committee for fear that 
privileged information they receive as committee members would expose them to insider trading 
liability if they bought or sold securities of the debtor during the case. The standard prophylactics 
are the use of a “Chinese Wall” and, more recently, so-called “Big Boy” letters. See, e.g., Daniel 
Sullivan, Comment, Big Boys and Chinese Walls, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 541–46 (2008). 
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order to effectuate other important principles, such as the smooth 
functioning of the securities markets. 
In Parts I, II, and III of this Article, I consider three of these issues in 
turn: (1) the exclusion of brokerage firms from Chapter 11 reorganization, 
(2) the protection of settlement payments from avoidance as preferences or 
fraudulent conveyances, and (3) the exemption of derivatives from the 
automatic stay and other basic bankruptcy provisions. I begin each part by 
discussing the provision and the concern it was designed to address. I then 
identify and assess important unintended consequences of the provisions. 
For instance, investment banks Drexel Burnham (Drexel) and Lehman 
Brothers (Lehman) both evaded the brokerage exclusion when they filed for 
bankruptcy; the settlement provision has been invoked in several high 
profile contexts that do not fit neatly within the core cases for which it was 
designed; and the application of the special derivatives protections has 
magnified the very systemic risk concerns they were designed to alleviate.14 
Part IV of this Article explores the implications of the awkward 
interaction between bankruptcy and securities law. I begin by speculating 
about how bankruptcy courts will handle each of these issues if Congress 
does not alter the current rules. I then consider how Congress might 
intervene in these areas to address some of the problems that have arisen. I 
focus extensively on the most complex of the issues, bankruptcy’s special 
protections for derivatives and other financial contracts. After surveying 
possible alternatives to the existing framework, I propose and defend two 
strategies for reform: the first and more novel approach would apply the 
stay in cases involving systemically important firms, but not in other cases; 
and the second proposal would impose the stay in all cases by removing the 
existing exemptions. The choice between these two approaches depends 
upon the overall structure of financial services regulation. 
The frictions between bankruptcy and securities law have increased 
with the growth in financial innovation in the past several decades, but the 
wall of separation between these two areas is rapidly eroding at the same 
time. If the erosion translates to less deference to the securities industry and 
more careful oversight of the bankruptcy-securities law intersection by 
Congress, it may, despite the erratic history to date, justify cautious 
optimism about the future integration of these long estranged bodies of law. 
I. THE BROKERAGE EXCLUSION FROM CHAPTER 11 
Since its original enactment in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code has excluded 
brokerages from Chapter 11 based on a concern for the protection of 
customer accounts and a perception that the rules governing customer 
                                                                                                                 
 14. For further discussion of these issues, see infra Parts I, II, & III. 
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accounts would make a Chapter 11 reorganization prohibitively complex.15 
The drafters of the provisions seem to have contemplated that troubled 
brokerages would be liquidated in Chapter 7, and that the liquidation would 
be coordinated with the insurance scheme for brokerage customers 
established by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA).16 
With the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, we can see that the 
brokerage exclusion was designed particularly with the brokerages of the 
1960s in mind: brokerages that were set up as simple partnerships, and 
generally provided brokerage and advisory services.17 The investment 
banking business had not yet been transformed by initial public offerings 
(IPOs) and the shift to proprietary trading as a major source of investment 
bank profits.18 Unlike their 1960s predecessors, most current investment 
banks have a complex capital structure consisting of multiple (sometimes 
hundreds or thousands) entities. 
The two major investment bank bankruptcies since the implementation 
of the exclusion have shown that, at least in the current environment, the 
special rules are quite easily evaded. When Drexel filed for bankruptcy in 
1990, it filed a Chapter 11 petition for its holding company and kept its 
brokerage subsidiary out of bankruptcy until it had time to move all of the 
customer accounts.19 Lehman used roughly the same strategy in 2008, 
putting its holding company in Chapter 11 and foregoing bankruptcy for its 
brokerage subsidiaries.20 
Lehman added a clever twist to the strategy used by Drexel. Lehman’s 
principal objective when it filed for bankruptcy was to quickly complete a 
sale of its brokerage operations to Barclays.21 However, there was one small 
problem with the sale. The power of the debtor to propose, and of the 
bankruptcy court to approve, sales free and clear of existing liabilities only 
                                                                                                                 
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (2006). The Bankruptcy Code includes special provisions for the 
protection of customer accounts in Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 741–67 (2006). 
 16. For an overview of the background and structure of SIPA, see Hugh L. Sowards & James 
S. Mofsky, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 26 BUS. LAW. 1271 (1971). 
 17. See id. at 1271–72 (describing SIPA as a response to the brokerage failures of the late 
1960s and early 1970s). 
 18. Alan D. Morrison and William J. Wilhelm, Jr. explain the shift to proprietary trading as a 
response to technological change that diminished the value of the tacit knowledge that had 
traditionally been investment banks’ stock in trade. ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, 
JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 225 (2007). This, and the need 
for capital, made the traditional partnership structure less attractive than shifting to corporate 
form. Id. 
 19. Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1362639. 
 20. See generally id. (discussing the Drexel and Lehman bankruptcies in more detail). 
 21. Id. (manuscript at 9). 
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extends to property of the bankruptcy estate.22 Because the brokerage 
subsidiary had not filed for bankruptcy, its assets were not part of Lehman’s 
bankruptcy estate. Thus, the assets technically were not subject to the 
bankruptcy court’s power to authorize a sale. 
To square the circle, Lehman coordinated with the SEC to set up a 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) proceeding for its North 
American brokerage operations simultaneously with the sale of its 
brokerage assets to Barclays.23 The brokerage entered liquidation just soon 
enough to whitewash the assets on their way to Barclays.24 Objectors 
challenged this maneuver at the hearing on Lehman’s sale, arguing that the 
brokerage was never property of the bankrupt entity’s estate and, therefore, 
the bankruptcy court lacked the power to authorize a “free and clear” sale of 
the assets of any subsidiary that had not been put into bankruptcy.25 But the 
court overruled the objections and permitted the sale to go through.26 
The Lehman sale was a tribute to bankruptcy lawyers’ ingenuity in 
circumventing a framework that once made sense, but is anachronistic in 
the current investment banking environment. The sale to Barclays was in 
the best interests of Lehman and its creditors, as the value of Lehman’s 
brokerage operations would have vanished otherwise.27 If the bankruptcy 
laws permitted an investment bank to file for Chapter 11, the fancy 
footwork used to make the sale possible would have been unnecessary. The 
brokerage exclusion might be justified, despite this effect, if its original 
rationale that Chapter 11 would be a quagmire, but Chapter 7 meant an 
orderly unwinding, held true. But the Drexel and Lehman experiences 
suggest that investment banks are likely to be sold rather than reorganized 
                                                                                                                 
 22. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or 
lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
 23. See generally Ben Hallman, A Moment’s Notice, AM. LAW., Dec.1, 2008, at 87, available 
at http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202426213501 (describing Lehman’s 
bankruptcy filing and the early sales). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See E-mail from Martin J. Bienenstock, Partner, Dewey & Leboeuf L.L.P., to David A. 
Skeel, Jr., S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School 
(Jan. 29, 2009, 13:58 EST) (on file with author).  
 26. Id. (describing the objection and the court’s dismissal). 
 27. Whether value in an absolute sense would have disappeared is not quite as clear. If the 
brokerage operations had independent franchise value as a unit, that value might have been 
undermined by delay. But if the value was simply a function of human capital of individual 
employees, the principal effect of delay might have been distributive, with Lehman losing their 
value and another bank gaining it without compensating Lehman. Relatedly, questions arose as to 
whether Lehman had obtained an adequate price, and Lehman also alleged that Barclays had 
fraudulently retained $5 billion in securities it was obligated to return. See, e.g., Michael J. de la 
Merced, Lehman’s Estate is Suing Over Unit’s Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009, at B8. These 
spats go to the terms of the deal; they do not necessarily reflect a destruction of value and do not 
call into question the need for a prompt sale. 
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in a Chapter 11 proceeding, and that Chapter 11 is an effective venue for 
achieving this goal.28 In each case, the Chapter 11 filing proceeded in two 
steps: an effort to rapidly sell assets whose value was time sensitive, 
followed by a more leisurely disposition of the firm’s other assets.29 
In Part IV, I will consider the obvious implications of this experience.30 
For present purposes, the principal point is that the brokerage exclusion has 
functioned quite differently than its drafters seem to have envisioned. 
Congress imagined that when investment banks filed for bankruptcy, they 
would be liquidated under the watchful eye of the SEC or a bankruptcy 
trustee.31 Both Drexel and Lehman sidestepped the trustee and used Chapter 
11 rather than Chapter 7. As we shall see, the disconnect between ostensible 
purpose and actual use is a recurring pattern in the Bankruptcy Code’s 
securities-oriented provisions. 
II. THE SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR SECURITIES 
SETTLEMENTS 
In 1982, Congress added a special provision to the Bankruptcy Code in 
order to protect margin call or settlement payments made by or to brokers 
from being challenged as preferences or fraudulent conveyances.32 The 
intuition is that these are ordinary brokerage operations, not preferences or 
fraudulent conveyances, and that the possibility of avoidance in the event of 
a bankruptcy could seriously interfere with the internal functioning of the 
securities markets. A witness at the principal congressional hearing testified 
that: 
If a firm or a clearing organization had to return margin payments received 
from a debtor when he had already transmitted those funds to others in the 
clearing chain, its finances could be seriously undermined to the point 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Although Drexel was eventually reorganized, most of its assets were sold prior to 
confirmation of the reorganization plan and the reorganized firm was a far smaller entity. See, e.g., 
Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 19 (manuscript at 12) (noting that the reorganized company, New 
Street Capital, would manage $450 million of Drexel’s junk bonds). 
 29. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 9–15) (discussing the two cases). 
 30. See infra Part IV.B.1 (recommending removal of the brokerage exclusion). 
 31. See supra notes 16–17 (describing the desire to protect customers’ accounts and the 
perception that Chapter 11 would be too complex). 
 32. Originally enacted as 11 U.S.C. § 546(d), the protection is now codified at 11 U.S.C. § 
546(e) (2006). Section 546(e) states that: 
Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this 
title, the trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment . . . or 
settlement payment . . . made by or to . . . a commodity broker, forward 
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or 
securities clearing agency . . . that is made before the commencement of the 
case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title. 
Id.  
2010] Bankruptcy Boundary Games 7 
 
where it might also be driven into bankruptcy . . . . [W]hen these moneys 
flow through the clearing chain, they are disbursed in many different 
directions, and there really is no way of tracing where they have gone. 
Any other firm in the chain would stand to have its own capital exposed if 
there were an attempt to recover these moneys.33 
Although the warning about ripple effect bankruptcies was no doubt 
exaggerated, the justification for protecting ordinary settlement operations 
is compelling. Payments to or from a broker to complete a trade, and for 
which the broker is simply a middleman, are not the kinds of transactions 
that the preference and fraudulent conveyance laws are designed to police. 
But Congress did not explicitly limit the protection in § 546(e) to this 
context. The provision itself states that a settlement payment made by or to 
one of a long list of market participants is protected.34 “Settlement 
payment” is explicitly defined by the Bankruptcy Code,35 but the definition 
is comically circular, repeating the term “settlement payment” six times.36 
As a result, the settlement payment protection can be seen—particularly if 
one is willing to squint—as applying to issues well outside the context for 
which it was ostensibly drafted. Two important examples illustrate the 
extent to which this potential has indeed materialized. 
The first example is leveraged buyouts (LBOs). When a number of 
LBOs quickly failed in the 1980s, bankruptcy courts were faced with the 
question as to whether the financing of an LBO should be deemed a 
fraudulent conveyance, given that the company took on substantial debt in 
connection with the transaction but did not retain the proceeds of the loan.37 
If some of the LBOs were indeed fraudulent conveyances, who should be 
held responsible? In several prominent cases, courts held that the public 
shareholders of a debtor could not be forced to disgorge the money they 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Bankruptcy of Commodity and Securities Brokers: Hearings before the Subcomm. on 
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 165 (1981) 
[hereinafter 1981 House Hearing] (testimony of Edmund R. Schroeder, Atty., Barrett, Smith, 
Schapiro, Simon & Armstrong). 
 34. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). 
 35. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (51A) (2006). 
 36. According to the definition set forth in the Bankruptcy Code, “The term ‘settlement 
payment’ means . . . a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim 
settlement payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement payment, a net settlement 
payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the forward contract trade.” Id. 
 37. One of the best analyses of the fraudulent conveyance issue is Douglas G. Baird, 
Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1991). 
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received for their stock.38 The courts based their conclusions largely on the 
Bankruptcy Code’s settlement provision.39 
Several other cases have questioned this interpretation of the statute, 
refusing to apply the settlement provision to protect payments to 
shareholders in an LBO if the broker or other institution never had a 
beneficial interest in the payments. In Matter of Mumford, for example, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the involvement of the financial institution was 
not sufficient to invoke the safe harbor because “the bank here was nothing 
more than an intermediary or conduit.”40 The court explained that the 
“[f]unds were deposited with the bank and when the bank received the 
shares from the selling shareholders, it sent funds to them in exchange. The 
bank never acquired a beneficial interest in either the funds or the shares.”41 
The second battleground involving the settlement provision was Enron. 
Shortly before filing for bankruptcy in late 2001, Enron bought significant 
amounts of its commercial paper at prices well above the prevailing market 
rate in an effort to protect its credit rating.42 It also purchased more than 
300,000 shares of its own stock from a swap counterparty and bought the 
notes of a Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) facility—again at above 
market rates—to satisfy obligations under those arrangements.43 After filing 
for bankruptcy, Enron challenged all of these purchases, arguing that the 
commercial paper transactions were in essence preferential payments of its 
commercial paper obligations, and that the stock and note transactions were 
constructively fraudulent since Enron paid appreciably more than the 
prevailing market value.44 In each case, the defendants argued that the 
purchases were settlement payments and, therefore, could not be avoided.45 
The peculiar dynamics of Enron’s plight, namely, its purchase of the 
paper in a desperate effort to fend off a catastrophic ratings downgrade, 
created a difficult tension between the settlement payment provision and 
bankruptcy’s preference and fraudulent conveyance provisions. In form, the 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See, e.g., Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505 (3d 
Cir. 1999); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230 
(10th Cir. 1991). 
 39. See In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 181 F.3d at 516–17; In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 952 F.2d at 
1240–41. 
 40. Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 
1996). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See generally Enron Corp. v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. (In re Enron), 325 B.R. 671 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 43. See Enron Corp. v. Int’l Fin. Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 341 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
 44. Int’l Fin. Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 341 B.R. 451; J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. (In re Enron 
Corp.), 325 B.R. 671; Enron Corp. v. Bear Stearns Int’l Ltd. (In re Enron Corp.), 323 B.R. 857 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 45. Int’l Fin. Corp. (In re Enron), 341 B.R. at 455; J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), 
325 B.R. at 681–82; Bear Stearns Int’l Ltd. (In re Enron), 323 B.R. at 863. 
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transactions were simply purchases of commercial paper, which look like 
new market transactions rather than payments to an existing creditor that 
would implicate the § 547 preference provision. Yet, their effect was to pay 
existing Enron creditors who would otherwise hold ordinary unsecured 
claims. 
The bankruptcy judge finessed this tension, as well as the uneasy fit 
between the cases and the core context for which the settlement payment 
safe harbor was designed, by asking whether the payments were of a type 
that is “common within the securities trade.”46 If so, he concluded, the 
payments would qualify as settlement payments and come within the safe 
harbor.47 Although he concluded that the CLO note purchases clearly 
qualified and, therefore, dismissed Enron’s action in that case, the judge 
refused to dismiss Enron’s avoidance actions with respect to its commercial 
paper and stock purchases.48 In these two cases, the status of the payments 
was a factual issue that could only be resolved through a hearing or trial.49 
The Enron decisions further illustrate the uncertainty as to just how far 
the settlement safe harbor sweeps. Not only was the bankruptcy court 
unable to resolve two of the three cases prior to trial,50 but the court 
introduced what is arguably a third approach to limiting the boundaries of 
the settlement payment safe harbor. The judge’s concern for what is 
“common within the securities trade”51 is narrower than the sweeping 
protection afforded in several of the LBO cases, but potentially broader than 
the “mere conduit” approach used in other LBO cases.52 
Much as the transformation of investment banking has rendered the 
brokerage exclusion obsolete, so too have LBOs and financial innovation 
introduced unanticipated complexities into the interpretation of the 
settlement provision. Courts seem to be wrestling with the tension between 
the broad language of the safe harbor, which weighs in favor of protection, 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), 325 B.R. at 677. 
 47. See, e.g., id. 
 48. Int’l Fin. Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 341 B.R. at 459 (holding that Enron’s purchase of 
notes qualified as settlement payment); J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), 325 B.R at 
677 (holding that the question whether commercial paper purchases are protected by section 
546(e) “is a factual issue requiring a trial”); Bear Stearns Int’l Ltd. (In re Enron Corp.), 323 B.R. 
at 859 (holding that Enron’s purchase of its own stock was not protected if it violated Oregon 
law). 
 49. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), 325 B.R. at 677 (holding that the question 
whether commercial paper purchases are protected by section 546(e) “is a factual issue requiring a 
trial”); Bear Stearns Int’l Ltd. (In re Enron Corp.), 323 B.R. at 877 n.9 (whether a “void payment 
was commonly used in the industry” would “at minimum” require a “factual hearing”). 
 50. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), 325 B.R. at 687; Bear Stearns Int’l Ltd. (In re 
Enron Corp.), 323 B.R. at 879. 
 51. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. (In re Enron Corp.), 325 B.R. at 677. 
 52. Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 
1996). 
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and the fact that the defendants in such cases are far removed from its core 
purpose of protecting middlemen in the securities settlement system. 
III. THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF DERIVATIVES IN 
BANKRUPTCY 
A final example of bankruptcy’s effort to accommodate securities law 
is the special protection afforded derivatives and other financial contracts in 
bankruptcy. The earliest version of these provisions in the Bankruptcy Code 
was enacted as part of the original 1978 legislation, which exempted 
commodities and forward contracts from the automatic stay and other core 
bankruptcy provisions.53 Additional exclusions have been added at regular 
intervals, most recently in 2005 and 2006.54 
The amendments have been championed by the principal industry 
lobbying organization, the International Swaps & Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), and the U.S. Federal Reserve and Treasury.55 These groups argued 
that if derivatives were not completely protected from the automatic stay, a 
bankruptcy involving a firm with significant derivatives exposure could 
snarl the financial system.56 As a representative from the Federal Reserve 
System (the Fed) explained in a 1999 submission to Congress: 
[T]he right to terminate or close-out financial market contracts is 
important to the stability of financial market participants . . . and reduces 
the likelihood that a single insolvency will trigger other insolvencies due 
to the non-defaulting counterparties’ inability to control their market risk. 
The right to terminate or close-out protects [financial institutions] . . . on 
an individual basis, and by protecting both the supervised and 
unsupervised market participants, protects the markets from systemic 
problems of “domino failures.57 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: 
Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
641, 644–45 (2005) (citing to Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 362(b)(6), 
548(d)(2)(B), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 2549). 
 54. In 1982, Congress added the settlement protection discussed in the last part, as well as a 
protection for margin payments; in 1984, Congress provided special exemptions for repurchase 
transactions. Id. at 644. In 1990, Congress exempted swap transactions; and in 2005, Congress 
expanded the protections for repos and for netting. Id. Several of the exclusions were further 
expanded in 2006. 
  In addition to the automatic stay (and related provisions), the exclusions insulate 
derivatives and other financial contracts from bankruptcy’s preference and fraudulent conveyance 
provisions. In the discussion that follows, I focus on the exemption from the automatic stay 
because this exemption has garnered the most attention. But, the exemption from preference and 
fraudulent conveyance attack is also problematic. 
 55. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 19, at 30. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part III): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 172–73 (1999) 
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Over the years, the testimony has been replete with similar warnings 
about “domino effect” and “ripple effect” failures unless financial contracts 
and securities transactions are protected from core bankruptcy provisions.58 
Most bankruptcy lawyers and judges have little familiarity with the 
securities markets. As a result, they largely deferred to the testimony of 
bank regulators and the securities industry each time Congress considered 
new expansions of the derivatives protections. The testimony of Bruce 
Bernstein, a prominent bankruptcy lawyer speaking on behalf of the 
National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC) on a proposal to expand protection 
for repurchase transactions, is particularly striking in this regard. Bernstein 
stated that his “experience [in secured lending] has been that markets do 
have a way of adjusting to shocks or interpretations of relationships that do 
not necessarily go the way the market thinks they should have gone 
initially.”59 But, he disclaimed any expertise on the implications of the 
treatment of derivatives, stating that “I really am not expert enough, nor is 
my crystal ball clear enough, to be able to respond in any certain way,”60 
and that “[t]he broad, economic policy arguments of these well-informed 
and highly respected institutions [the Fed and the Public Securities 
Association] . . . are, quite frankly, beyond the scope of the NBC’s 
expertise and its normal areas of inquiry.”61 Fifteen years later, NBC 
representatives did question the necessity of further expansion of the 
protections, but by then the die had long since been cast and the testimony 
had little impact.62 
As with each of the issues previously considered, the derivatives 
protections have given rise to unintended consequences. In the case of 
derivatives and other financial contracts, the consequences stem less from 
subsequent market developments than from the provisions themselves. 
Whereas the provisions originally sought to protect particular parties, they 
now extend to the entire market for derivatives and other financial 
                                                                                                                 
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 Hearing (Part III)] (prepared statement of Oliver 
Ireland, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.). 
 58. See generally id. 
 59. Bankruptcy Law and Repurchase Agreements: Hearing on H.R. 2852 and H.R. 3418 
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong. 73 (1984) (testimony of H. Bruce Bernstein, Atty., Sidley Austin L.L.P., on behalf of the 
National Bankruptcy Conf.). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 Hearing (Part III), supra note 57, at 177 (prepared 
statement of Randal C. Picker, Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, University of Chicago 
Law School, on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conf.) (“There is no indication that the absence 
of such cross-product netting features has led to widespread difficulties or systematic disruptions 
in the financial markets for such products. In addition, master netting could deprive a debtor of 
much-needed cash collateral . . . .”). See also id. at 46–58 (statement of Kenneth N. Klee, 
Professor, University of California Los Angeles School of Law, on behalf of the National 
Bankruptcy Conf.). 
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contracts.63 Counterparties to a debtor that files for bankruptcy are exempt 
from the automatic stay, permitted to invoke any termination clause, and are 
protected from bankruptcy’s preference and fraudulent conveyance 
provisions.64 
Prior to the recent financial crisis, several commentators pointed out 
that permitting counterparties to terminate is at least as likely to create 
systematic problems—by inviting runs in the event of financial distress—as 
to counteract them.65 Regulators’ responses to the recent crisis seem to 
confirm these criticisms. The decision to bail out Bear Stearns, rather than 
to allow it to file for bankruptcy, stemmed at least in part from the 
perceived consequences of default and termination for the repo and 
derivatives markets.66 According to a column in the New York Times, 
“[f]ears of so-called counterparty risk arising from credit default swaps on 
the books of Bear Stearns . . . were central to the investment bank’s 
unraveling in March [2008] and the rescue engineered by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and JPMorgan Chase.”67 The onset of AIG’s 
financial distress six months later triggered a simultaneous wave of 
collateral demands that forced the government to choose between a massive 
bailout and allowing it to file for bankruptcy.68 Largely because of the 
perceived effect on the credit default swap market, the government opted 
for a bailout whose cost is estimated at $180 to $200 billion as of this 
writing.69 Whether an AIG default would have cascaded through the 
financial system, as regulators feared, is subject to vigorous debate, but 
regulators clearly did not trust counterparties’ exemption from the 
bankruptcy stay to neutralize potential systemic effects. 
The experience of Lehman, the one major derivatives player that was 
allowed to file for bankruptcy, suggests that bankruptcy professionals may 
                                                                                                                 
 63. I borrow this characterization from an insightful article by Morrison & Riegel, supra note 
53. 
 64. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(7) (exempting repos from stay), § 559 (exempting repos from 
invalidation of ipso facto clauses), § 546(f) (exempting repos from avoidance) (2006). 
 65. Key early articles questioning the systemic risk rationale include Franklin R. Edwards & 
Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 
YALE J. REG. 91, 94 (2005); Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 BUS. LAW. 1507, 
1541–42 (2005); Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, 
Collateral, and Closeout, 2 J. FIN. STAB. 55, 67–69 (2006). See also Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 
19; David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV. 696, 738–40 (2008); Frank 
Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise & Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CINN. L. REV. 
1019, 1049 (2007). 
 66. See generally Gretchen Morgenson, A Window in a Smoky Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2008, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/business/06gret.html. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 962 (2010) 
(the AIG “credit downgrade trigger[ed] additional posting obligations” on its credit default 
swaps). 
 69. Id. at 974. 
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respond by creatively interpreting the exclusions to reduce counterparties’ 
ability to exit. Although counterparties of trades with Lehman affiliates that 
had not filed for bankruptcy should have been able to terminate their 
contracts and retrieve the collateral securing them, Lehman successfully 
argued that the collateral, which consisted of various financial assets, had 
been commingled with the holding company’s general accounts, and, 
therefore, were subject to the automatic stay.70 Based on this claim, Lehman 
retained control of the assets.71 
Particularly with major players in the derivatives markets, the recent 
stress test of the special exclusion of derivatives and other financial 
contracts from core provisions of the Bankruptcy Code raises serious 
questions about the wisdom of the exclusions. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BOUNDARY GAMES 
With each of the issues we have considered, Congress has concluded 
that, as between the securities markets and the normal operations of the 
bankruptcy laws, bankruptcy should give way and the markets should 
prevail. In each case, the special protection has proven problematic. Debtors 
have sidestepped the requirement that broker-dealers file for Chapter 7 
rather than Chapter 11; the settlement protection afforded the securities 
markets has been the subject of increasing uncertainty; and during the 
recent crisis, the special treatment of derivatives was a problem rather than 
a solution. This section considers the future of these provisions. I begin by 
speculating about implications in the absence of any legislative 
intervention. I then consider how Congress might alter the existing rules to 
more effectively manage the boundary between bankruptcy and the 
securities markets. 
A. MANAGING THE GROWING TENSIONS 
The increasing friction at the boundary between bankruptcy law and the 
securities markets is not accidental. Each of the special protections affected 
relatively few cases when it was first enacted. But with the transformation 
of investment banking and the explosion of financial innovation, the 
securities markets, traditional corporate enterprise, and bankruptcy have 
become increasingly intertwined. Despite the recent financial crisis, this 
tendency will surely continue. 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Events of Default: Is the Bankruptcy Provision Gutted?, WESTLAW BUS. CURRENTS 
EXTRA, http://www3.gsionline.com/FORMS/BankruptcyEvents.asp?cid-cibwqa0011jn  
(describing suits by Evergreen Solar, Bank of America, Nomura Global and Freddie Mac to 
retrieve their financial asset collateral). 
 71. Id. 
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The exclusion of investment banks from Chapter 11 has been rendered 
largely (but not completely) irrelevant by the shift in banks’ corporate 
structures and their use of Chapter 11 for holding companies and non-
brokerage affiliates. As we have seen, the principal limitations of the 
strategy stem from the limits on the ability of the brokerage itself, because 
it is not in bankruptcy, to take advantage of provisions such as § 363.72 
Given the benefits to both the debtor and its creditors, courts are likely to 
continue authorizing sales of brokerage assets. 
With the settlement safe harbor and derivatives exemptions, the 
provisions are now drafted so broadly that the market transactions may 
continue to prevail over the automatic stay and other core bankruptcy 
provisions. Several commentators have recently defended the breadth of the 
provisions, predicting that they will reduce uncertainty by curbing 
bankruptcy judges’ discretion to protect some transactions but not others.73 
This prognosis may well be correct since it accords with the general 
Congressional strategy of insulating these markets from ordinary 
bankruptcy rules. But the breadth of the provisions will magnify the 
frictions they cause, as the provisions increasingly crop up in contexts in 
which they were not intended to apply. These frictions will be further 
exacerbated by doubts as to whether the special derivatives protections are 
justified, and by the widespread use of derivatives by ordinary businesses. 
Indeed, after agonizing whether a small business debtor’s commodity 
contract with a natural gas supplier should be characterized as a swap, and 
thus, exempt from bankruptcy’s avoidance provisions, a bankruptcy judge 
recently refused to construe the exemptions broadly “[b]ecause the contract 
[was] not clearly within the definition of swap agreement the court will not 
upset the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code by affording the transfers 
under the contract the protections afforded to swap agreements and swap 
participants.”74 
If the prediction that bankruptcy courts will balk at giving the 
derivatives exclusions their full reach in some cases is correct, it raises two 
possible concerns. The first is the costs of uncertainty.75 When bankruptcy 
courts have raised questions about financial innovations that were thought 
to be insulated from bankruptcy, the decisions have often had an immediate, 
                                                                                                                 
 72. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006). 
 73. See, e.g., Morrison & Riegel, supra note 53, at 641. 
 74. Natural Gas Distributors, L.L.C. v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc. (In re Natural Gas 
Distributors), 369 B.R. 884, 900 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007), rev’d, 556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009). As 
of this writing, this decision has been reversed by the Fourth Circuit and remanded to the 
bankruptcy court for further consideration. Id. 
 75. See Morrison & Riegel, supra note 53, at 644. 
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negative market impact.76 If bankruptcy courts do not effectively 
distinguish between cases where the special protections are or are not 
warranted, the uncertainty costs could be still higher. 
The second concern is not entirely distinct from the first, but has a 
different focus. The bankruptcy rules are designed to effectively resolve the 
financial distress of a particular debtor, and bankruptcy judges’ decisions 
tend to reflect this orientation. This approach generally works well, but it 
may prove problematic if a decision that maximizes the value of the 
debtor’s assets could have costly spillover effects on parties outside the 
bankruptcy. As we have seen, concerns about spillover effects, especially 
systemic risk, are a recurrent theme in the legislative history of the special 
protections for financial contracts.77 If bankruptcy judges do not fully take 
spillover effects into account, and if the risk of these effects is real, the 
exercising of judicial discretion by courts could benefit debtors and their 
creditors while inflicting broader damage on the markets. 
B. LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Bankruptcy judges and professionals have adapted to many of the 
problematic effects of the boundary rules we have considered. But the 
adaptations are invariably imperfect. Next, I explore how Congress could 
clarify the murky waters if lawmakers were inclined to intervene. 
1. The Brokerage Exclusion from Chapter 11 
As we have seen, parties have responded to the brokerage exclusion by 
working around it. Yet, their solution of putting affiliates, but not the 
brokerage, in bankruptcy is an imperfect proxy for Chapter 11. Technically, 
the brokerage cannot take advantage of benefits such as § 363. The 
brokerage exclusion could also interfere with the changes to bankruptcy’s 
treatment of derivatives (discussed below) since any derivatives held by a 
brokerage subsidiary that did not file for bankruptcy would not be 
protected. Although the exclusion once could be justified, it no longer 
serves any real purpose. Congress could appreciably simplify the 
bankruptcy process for investment banks by repealing the brokerage 
exclusion. 
2. The Safe Harbor for Settlement Payments 
The simplest solutions to the uncertainties created by the safe harbor for 
settlement payments would be either to explicitly limit the safe harbor to its 
                                                                                                                 
 76. A decision in the LTV Corporation bankruptcy suggesting that an asset securitization 
would not qualify as a true sale temporarily jolted the securitization market in 2001. See In re 
LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 77. Supra text accompanying note 57. 
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original purpose of protecting securities middlemen in market transaction, 
or to broadly protect every transaction that takes place through the 
settlement system.78 But neither of these bright line approaches is 
particularly attractive. If only securities professionals were protected, 
ordinary market investors could find themselves subject to fraudulent 
conveyance or preference challenge due to the breadth of the bankruptcy 
avoidance provisions.79 Explicitly protecting all of these transactions, on the 
other hand, would shelter the recipients of problematic transfers due to the 
happenstance of a connection to the financial markets. The volume of 
transactions that now take place on the financial markets is so great that a 
blanket protection of them would afford protection to some that do not 
warrant it. 
The current provision provides an escape valve because it does not 
protect transfers that amount to actual fraud.80 But unless fraud is construed 
liberally, the fraud exception is not broad enough to police potentially 
problematic transactions.81 One strategy for legislatively achieving a more 
workable middle ground would be to amend the safe harbor provision to 
provide differing levels of protection for market middlemen and other 
participants in the market. Lawmakers could provide blanket protection for 
market middlemen, absent fraud, while protecting investors and other 
participants unless they knew or should have known that they were the 
beneficiary of a preference or fraudulent conveyance. As bankruptcy old-
timers will recognize, this standard echoes one of the requirements for 
avoiding a preference under the old Bankruptcy Act.82 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Interestingly, if Congress eliminated the safe harbor altogether, securities middlemen 
might well be protected by courts from preference or fraudulent conveyance attack. To the extent 
the middleman is simply a conduit for settlement payments, he is not really the recipient of a 
transfer. 
 79. The preference and constructive fraud provisions use a strict liability approach that does 
not take motive or knowledge into account—this is the principal source of their breadth. See 11 
U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 548(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 80. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006). 
 81. For an example of elastic interpretation of the fraud under § 546(e), see Gredd v. Bear 
Stearns Sec. Corp. (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510, 516–27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2007). In that case, the court concluded that the debtor, a hedge fund, had functioned as a Ponzi 
scheme, and thus that any transactions with the fund were potentially fraudulent. Id. at 518. The 
court also concluded that settlement payments to Bear Stearns, its prime broker, could therefore be 
challenged as fraudulent conveyances. Id. at 523–26. For an extensive critique of In re Manhattan 
Inv. Fund Ltd., see Peter S. Kim, Navigating the Safe Harbors: Two Bright Line Rules to Assist 
Courts in Applying the Stockbroker Defense and the Good Faith Defense, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 657, 676–79 (2008). 
 82. Under former section 60, the trustee was required to show that the recipient of an alleged 
preferential transfer knew or should have known the debtor was insolvent at the time of the 
transfer. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). This requirement 
was criticized as making it too difficult to avoid preferences. See, e.g., Chaim J. Fortgang & 
Lawrence P. King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1148, 1165–66 (1981) (describing the complaint). 
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Consider how this rule might function in an LBO. In many of these 
cases, insiders and large shareholders negotiate the terms of the buyout. If 
the debtor later files for bankruptcy and the trustee challenges the LBO as 
fraudulent, any brokers who handled the payments would be protected. The 
old shareholders also would be protected unless the trustee could show that 
they knew or should have known the transaction could be avoidable as a 
fraudulent transfer. The trustee might well be able to make this showing 
with respect to the insiders, but most likely not to the ordinary investor. 
Consequently, most ordinary investors would be protected. 
The chief shortcoming of this approach is the difficulty in determining 
when the recipient knew or should have known that she was the recipient of 
a potentially avoidable transfer. But, given the cost of pursuing an 
avoidance action, a trustee or debtor-in-possession would rarely pursue 
these avoidance actions unless significant money was at stake and strong 
evidence existed showing that the recipient was aware that the payment she 
received was problematic. 
3. Imposing a Stay on Derivatives and Other Financial 
Contracts 
If lawmakers reform the current exemption of derivatives from the 
automatic stay, their most plausible strategies are to (1) adopt a transaction 
or product-based approach by exempting some financial contracts from the 
automatic stay but not others; (2) apply the automatic stay in the bankruptcy 
of some kinds of firms but not others; and/or (3) apply the automatic stay to 
all financial contracts, thus ending their special treatment. Next, I consider 
the intuition underlying each of the three approaches. 
With respect to the first, the case for exempting some products is 
stronger than for others. Subjecting repos to the automatic stay might 
significantly interfere with the repo market, since repo loans are extended 
on a very short term basis.83 The case for exempting credit default swaps, 
on the other hand, is weaker.84 Under this approach, Congress would revisit 
                                                                                                                 
 83. On the other hand, if the repo creditor is fully collateralized, any harm from the stay should 
be limited. Gary Gorton has recently argued that repo financing is analogous to traditional deposit 
banking, and should be protected by a government guarantee analogous to deposit insurance. See, 
e.g., Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007 
(May 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401882&rec=1&srcabs=1436913. Although such a reform seems 
unlikely, if it were adopted it would further reduce the consequences of a stay for repo lenders. 
 84. Proponents of special treatment of swaps emphasize the standard systemic risk concern 
that preventing counterparties from terminating could cause “ripple effect” failures. Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1999 Hearing (Part III), supra note 57, at 172–73 (prepared statement of Oliver 
Ireland, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.). They also argue that a 
party who depended on a swap for hedging purposes might have difficulty replacing the hedge and 
would run the risk of ending up with a duplicative hedge if the debtor later assumed its contract. 
Id. None of these contentions are especially persuasive, however. The counterparty itself can 
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each of the exemptions and remove the least compelling. In a sense, it 
would reverse the historic pattern of continuously expanding the special 
treatment of derivatives, and winnow down the protected list. 
The second approach would distinguish among types of debtors, rather 
than focus on particular products. For instance, one commentator has 
recently argued that the automatic stay should apply if the debtor is not a 
financial institution, but counterparties should retain their exemption with 
financial institution debtors.85 The reasoning is that a derivative may be 
important to a nonfinancial debtor’s going concern value and, therefore, 
should be protected.86 A second proposal, which I have outlined briefly 
elsewhere, would draw a different line, distinguishing between ordinary and 
systemically important financial institutions.87 Under this proposal, the stay 
would apply only to systemically important institutions. This proposal 
draws on the experience of the recent financial crisis, which seems to 
confirm concerns that the absence of a stay could magnify the systemic 
effects of a large financial institution’s default.88 
The final approach would reverse the special protections altogether, 
based on a view that the arguments for exempting the derivatives and other 
financial contracts from bankruptcy no longer seem compelling. Exempting 
derivatives counterparties from the stay reduces their incentive to monitor 
the debtor and does not seem to provide a bulwark against systemic risk. 
While each of these approaches has drawbacks, each proposal seems 
preferable to the existing framework. Let me briefly expand on the two that 
seem most compelling: the stay for systemically important institutions and 
the blanket stay.89 The proposal for a stay on systemically important 
institutions might proceed in two steps.90 First, the Fed would be instructed 
                                                                                                                 
minimize their risk through the simple expedient of limiting its exposure to any given debtor, for 
instance, and the counterparty often would be able to sell a duplicative hedge to a third party. 
Moreover, the uncertainty could be reduced under a rule that required the debtor to make prompt 
decisions on assumptions, much as bank regulators do in a bank insolvency. 
 85. Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special Treatment 
3–5 (Seton Hall Public Law Research, Working Paper No. 1265070, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265070. 
 86. See id. 
 87. David A. Skeel, Jr., Give Bankruptcy a Chance, WKLY. STANDARD, June 29–July 6, 2009, 
at 25. 
 88. See Sjostrom, supra note 68, at 962. The AIG “credit downgrade trigger[ed] additional 
posting obligations” on its credit default swaps. Id. 
 89. Lubben’s contention that derivatives held by nonfinancial entities should be stayed is 
sensible, but is subject to two limitations. See Lubben, supra note 84, at 3–5. First, and most 
obvious, it does not address the need for a stay in insolvencies involving nonbank financial 
institutions. Second, it could be circumvented. A financial institution that wished to evade the stay 
could interpose another financial institution between itself and the debtor. 
 90. For another, somewhat analogous proposal for singling out systemically important 
institutions, see Lee C. Buchheit & David A. Skeel, Jr., Some Bankruptcies are Worth It, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 19, 2009, at A25. Under this approach, lawmakers would provide for a transition 
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to designate the financial institutions it deems to be systemically important. 
As the regulator most concerned with systemic risk, and having conducted 
“stress tests” of the leading banks in early 2008, the Fed is the logical 
choice to determine which institutions are systemically important, and to do 
so in advance. Second, if a systemically important institution filed for 
bankruptcy, its derivatives and other financial contracts would be subject to 
the automatic stay.91 
The bankruptcy-plus-stay proposal for systemically important 
institutions would reduce the danger that an institution would dismember 
itself prior to bankruptcy in response to collateral calls, as AIG threatened 
to do, as well as reduce the threat that mass cancellation of contracts and 
collateral sales would drive down asset prices and increase the damage to 
other institutions. The proposal might also curb the perceived need for 
bailouts, give counterparties and creditors a greater incentive to monitor, 
and encourage the managers of a systemically important institution to plan 
for the possibility of bankruptcy, rather than trying to portray bankruptcy as 
a looming catastrophe in order to secure rescue funding.92 The most obvious 
concern with the proposal stems from its singling out of institutions that are 
systemically important. This special treatment could reward institutions that 
were given the “systemically important” designation, and perpetuate a 
status that creates serious distortions in the markets.93 In practice, however, 
the proposal seems equally likely to discourage firms, rather than invite 
them, to attain “systemically important” status. Because the counterparties 
of a designated firm would be subject to the stay if the firm filed for 
bankruptcy, the proposal would increase counterparties’ incentives to deal 
with non-designated institutions if they wished to avoid the possibility of a 
stay in the event their counterparties encountered financial distress. The 
incentive to deal with non-designated institutions could help to erode the 
dominance of the derivatives industry by a handful of financial institutions. 
The other strategy, a blanket stay on derivatives and other financial 
instruments, avoids the line drawing concerns created by approaches that 
apply the stay to some firms but not to others. The chief objections to the 
stay, as we have seen, stem from the consequences of preventing 
counterparties from exiting their contracts.94 The value of the contracts and 
of any collateral is extremely volatile. Accordingly, counterparties could be 
                                                                                                                 
period prior to bankruptcy during which the institution could attempt to raise money or arrange for 
a sale of its assets. 
 91. In order to make the stay fully effective, Congress also would need to reverse the 
brokerage exclusion from Chapter 11, as discussed in Part IV.A. Otherwise, the stay would not 
protect any derivatives or other financial contracts held by the brokerage entity. 
 92. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 19; Skeel, supra note 87, at 25. 
 93. See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, Too Big to Fail, or Succeed, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2009, at 
A17. 
 94. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
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damaged by the uncertainty as to whether the debtor will assume or reject 
their contract, and the cost of re-hedging contracts that the debtor rejects 
could be devastating if the contract is substantial. 
Although these are legitimate concerns, they must be weighed against 
the very substantial benefits of the stay. The prospect of a stay would give 
counterparties an added incentive both to carefully monitor the debtor and 
to avoid overexposing themselves to a single counterparty. Moreover, the 
costs of the stay could be reduced by assessing the value of the collateral as 
of the date of the bankruptcy filing and by setting tight deadlines on the 
debtor’s decision to assume or reject the contract. 
Between the limited and blanket stay, the determination as to which is 
preferable depends importantly on the nature of financial regulation. The 
case for a stay that targets systemically important institutions is strongest in 
a regulatory regime that singles out systemically important firms for distinct 
treatment.95 There are many reasons for concern about such a regime. For 
example, the perception that some firms are too big to fail is likely to distort 
capital markets, as lenders favor the firms that are thought to be protected. 
If the regulatory framework does make such distinctions, however, the 
targeted stay could curb the incentive to acquire systemically important 
status to some extent. In a regime that does not single out systemically 
important firms, a blanket stay is likely to be most compelling. It has the 
virtue of simplicity, and does not introduce the boundary issues that would 
arise with a distinction between systemically important and other 
institutions. Both approaches are, however, preferable to the current 
exemption from the bankruptcy stay. 
CONCLUSION 
The securities market exclusions from core provisions of the 
bankruptcy laws have an awkward history. In each case, lawmakers swept 
with a broad brush, giving a wide berth to the operations of the securities 
markets, and they did so at a time when the special treatment was quite 
uncontroversial. Nearly everyone was happy to leave the markets alone. 
With the rapid evolution of the markets in the past several decades, 
however, the provisions are no longer on the periphery of the bankruptcy 
process, and they have given rise to a steady stream of unintended 
consequences. Debtors have sidestepped the brokerage exclusion from 
Chapter 11, the settlement safe harbor has been invoked in contexts well 
                                                                                                                 
 95. The financial reforms proposed by the Obama administration in the first half of 2009 
would have precisely this effect. The administration released a lengthy white paper outlining its 
financial reform proposals in June 2009. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_ 
web.pdf. 
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outside the transactions it was originally designed to protect, and the 
exemption from the stay for derivatives and other financial contracts 
performed much differently than advertised when Bear Stearns, Lehman 
and AIG failed. 
In addition to speculating about the future of these provisions as 
bankruptcy judges continue to apply them under new or unanticipated 
conditions, I outlined possible legislative responses to each. The case for 
reversing the exclusion of brokerages from Chapter 11 seems 
straightforward and compelling. It also seems clear that Congress should 
reverse course on its relentless expansion of special protections for financial 
contracts, although the best strategy is debatable. The case for a legislative 
rewrite is weakest for the settlement safe harbor, but here too reform might 
reduce the current confusion. 
Although the current treatment of the provisions we have considered is 
marked by evasion and confusion, there are grounds for encouragement 
going forward. The penchant for broad exclusions has been tied in 
important respects to the sharp line between securities law and bankruptcy 
law dating back to the New Deal. Largely unfamiliar with the securities 
markets, bankruptcy lawyers and judges generally accepted the doomsday 
claims of banking regulators and securities industry interest groups like 
ISDA, who insisted that Armageddon would ensue in the absence of special 
protections. However, the line between securities markets and bankruptcy is 
rapidly eroding. This development, coupled with the harsh light the recent 
financial crisis has cast on the earlier claims about the virtues of 
unregulated derivatives markets, make it more likely that these issues will 
be addressed in a balanced and better integrated fashion. 
